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SELF AND OTHER IN SF: ALIEN ENCOUNTERS 15 
Carl D. Malmgren 
Self and Other in SF: Alien Encounters 
1. Alien Encounter SF 
When science fiction uses its limitless range of symbol and metaphor novelistical- 
ly, with the subject at the center, it can show us who we are, and where we are, 
and what choices face us, with unsurpassed clarity, and with a great and troubling 
beauty. -Ursula K. LeGuin, The Language of the Night 
Rendering the alien, making the reader experience it, is the crucial contribution 
of SF. 
-Gregory Benford, "Effing the Ineffable" 
Some critics have argued that SF, given its discursive grounding in the 
epistemology of science and its a priori assumption of an impersonal, value- 
neutral universe, is generically inimical to the depiction and exploration of 
"character." Scott Sanders, for example, suggests that "in the twentieth 
century science fiction is centrally about the disappearance of character, in the 
same sense in which the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novel is about 
the emergence of character" (132; italics in original). In this line of argu- 
ment, the very idea of character is predicated on a liberal humanism that the 
scientific worldview has obviated. This critical position ignores, overlooks, or 
is ignorant of alien-encounter SF, that which has as its narrative dominant 
the confrontation between terran representative and alien actant. This kind 
of encounter necessarily keeps "the subject at the center," exploring not only 
who we are (in the classic, liberal sense) but also what we might become in 
a future certain to be different from the present. 
Alien-encounter SF involves the introduction of sentient alien beings into 
the actantial system of the fictional universe; one or more of the actants are 
nonhuman or subhuman or superhuman. Like SF in general, this type of 
fiction may feature a number of different novums, but in it the actantial 
system predominates. LeGuin's Left Hand of Darkness, for example, deals 
with ambisexual aliens, two contrastive nation-states, and an ice-age world. 
The novel's dominant, however, is the encounter between terran self and 
alien other, and the novel is typologically alien-encounter SF. The encounter 
with the alien inevitably broaches the question of the Self and the Other. In 
general, the reader recuperates this type of fiction by comparing human and 
alien entities, trying to understand what it means to be human. 
Since the alien actant can take a wide variety of forms, alien-encounter 
SF includes a wide spectrum of fictions. The alien other might take the form 
of a technologically transformed version of the self, as in Frederik Pohl's 
Man Plus or Joseph McElroy's Plus. It might appear in the form of a 
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mutant, as in A.E. van Vogt's Slan, or in the form of a monstrous alter ego, 
as in Wells's The Invisible Man or Stevenson's Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. 
Humans can themselves create or invent an alien being, either benevolent, 
as in George Alec Effmger's The Wolves of Memory; malevolent, as in 
Harlan Ellison's "I Have No Mouth, and I Must Scream"; or ethically 
neutral, as in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. The most common form of the 
alien is, of course, the extraterrestrial, but even that kind of encounter 
admits of variation. The alien might appear on Earth by accident, in need 
of assistance, as in the movie E.T. The alien might come here by design, 
either to save humanity from itself, as in Arthur C. Clarke's Childhood's 
End, or to subjugate or annihilate the human race, as in Wells's The War of 
the Worlds. The alien might appear here and attach itself to the human 
body, either as a parasite (Robert Heinlein's The Puppet Masters) or as a 
symbiont (Hal Clement's Needle), in so doing converting a human self into 
an alien other. Although some critics (e.g., Rose, Wolfe) would assign these 
fictions to separate categories, I would argue that they share a common 
dominant novum, an alien actant, which determines their typological identity 
and circumscribes their thematic field. These fictions explore the nature of 
selfhood from the vantage point of alterity. 
In their critique of alien-encounter SF, critics have pursued two different 
lines of argument. One line claims that whatever form the alien might take, 
it is never really alien. The scientist Loren Eiseley complains: "In the 
modern literature on space travel I have read about cabbage men and bird 
men; I have investigated the loves of lizard men and the tree men, but in 
each case I have labored under no illusion. I have been reading about man, 
Homo sapiens, that common earthling" (cited in Pielke, 30). Related to this 
is the charge that SF tends to rely heavily on stereotypes in its portrayal of 
"character." Even a sympathetic and discerning critic such as Robert Scholes 
admits that "it is fair to say that the representation of unique individuality 
is not so much an end in itself in SF as it has been in some realistic novels" 
(48). Scholes fails to point out that the novels he has in mind are character- 
dominant; i.e., that bourgeois notions of the centrality of the individuated 
actant inform these novels' ontology. He also seems to have confused SF 
featuring other dominants (gadgets, alternate worlds, alternate societies) 
with the totality of the genre. When evaluating SF, one must pay attention 
to the nature of the dominant novum. While some SF (like other forms of 
fiction) resorts to stock characters and stereotypes in elaborating its roster 
of actants, good alien-encounter SF just cannot do that. The alien actant and 
its human counterpart occupy the story's center stage, and an exploration of 
their respective qualities is the sine qua non of the fiction. 
Other readers of SF, more aware of the richness of the alien-encounter 
tradition, have proposed ways of discriminating between forms of alienity in 
SF. Author and critic Gregory Benford, for example, distinguishes between 
"anthropocentric" and "unknowable" aliens: the former consist of "exagger- 
ations of human traits"; the latter, alien at the "most basic level," partake 
of an "essential strangeness" ("Aliens and Knowability" 53, 56). The basic 
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parameter here is the degree of alienity, the extent to which the alien 
adheres to or departs from anthropocentric norms. This degree, it should be 
clear, is a function of the mental operation used to generate the alien. Here 
we can make a basic distinction regarding the nature of that operation, one 
tying alien-encounter SF to other forms of the genre. The author may 
proceed either by extrapolation, creating a fictional novum by logical 
projection or extension from existing actualities, or by speculation, making 
a quantum leap of the imagination toward an other state of affairs.' Thus we 
can speak of extrapolative ncounters involving anthropocentric aliens and 
speculative encounters involving unknowable aliens. As Benford notes, the 
anthropocentric alien serves primarily as a "mirror" for us, "a way to 
examine our problems in a different light" ("Aliens and Knowability" 54). 
The act of extrapolation insists that there is a line of connection between 
terran and alien actants, between Us and Them. The act of making that 
connection forces us to explore what it means to be human. 
The case of the speculative encounter is more problematic. It should be 
clear that the otherness of the "unknowable alien" is itself a matter of 
degree; as Benford notes in another essay, "one cannot depict the totally 
alien" ("Effing" 14). Patrick Parrinder points out that "any meaningful act 
of defamiliarization can only be relative, since it is not possible for man to 
imagine what is utterly alien to him. To give meaning to something is also, 
inescapably, to 'humanize' it or to bring it within the bounds of our anthro- 
pomorphic world view" (150). Indeed, the relationship between figure and 
ground upon which perception is based abrogates the possibility of absolute 
otherness; one needs a background to distinguish the salient features of the 
foreground. Built into the concept of otherness is the idea of relationship, 
the question other than what? In terms of the alien encounter that what is 
necessarily defined in human terms. 
And yet, as Benford points out, the speculative encounter insists that 
aliens are finally aliens, not just metaphors, and that "important issues turn 
upon admitting alien ways of knowing" ("Effing" 15). The speculative leap 
which generates the alien actant encodes a degree of excess that cannot 
finally be mastered or appropriated. The speculative writer inscribes an 
actant who transgresses basic characterological norms, whose relation to our 
world is less logical than analogical or even anagogical; Benford cites as a 
paradigm here the human encounter with God ("Aliens and Knowability" 
56). These alien actants explore the limitations of being human and suggest 
the possibility of transcending those limits. They examine what we are not, 
in so doing intimating what we could become. Any attempt to naturalize 
them, to humanize them, fails, since they encode a degree of excess, an 
"essential strangeness," that cannot finally be mastered. The speculative 
encounter resists readerly recuperation; it presents itself as an experience to 
be undergone, not a lesson to be learned. 
The second axis of critique of alien-encounter SF has to do with sets of 
relations between human self and alien other. American SF in particular, 
Stanislaw Lem charges, has been guilty of oversimplifying the human/alien 
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encounter, of reducing it to a single option: "Rule them or be ruled by 
them" (Solaris ?11:167). This Us-or-Them mentality, Lem points out, 
represents a failure of the imagination. Authors who see the encounter in 
these terms are merely giving way to paranoia, projecting "their fears and 
self-generated delusions on the universe" (Lem, Microworlds 247), converting 
it into an arena for a Hobbesian war of all against all, in which the only 
possible relation between sentient beings is antagonism. "I'm an expert on 
alien psychology," a character in Robert Silverberg's The Man in the Maze 
claims. "I know more about it than any other human being, because I'm the 
only one who ever said hello to an alien race. Kill the stranger: it's the law 
of the universe. And if you don't kill him, at least screw him up a little" 
(?7:110). This "law," though it does hold true for some alien-encounter SF, 
simply cannot cover the spectrum of shapes that the self/other encounter 
can take and has taken. There are a number of permutations inherent in the 
alien-encounter formulation-e.g., other as enemy, other as self, other as 
other-and the most cognitively rewarding alien-encounter SF explores these 
various possibilities. In order to survey this spectrum of possible relations, 
we must turn our attention to specific representative texts. 
2. Human and Inhuman Aliens: Other-as-Self, Other-as-Enemy 
Thus, we see SF as a genre in an unstable equilibrium or compromise between 
two factors. The first is a cognitive-philosophical and incidentally politi- 
cal-potentiality as a genre that grows out of the subversive, lower-class form of 
"inverted world." The second is a powerful upper and middle-class ideology that 
has, in the great majority of texts, sterilized such potential horizons by contami- 
nating them with mystifications about the eternaLly "human" and "individual" 
which preclude significant presentations of truly other relationships. -Angenot 
and Suvin, "Not Only but Also: Reflections on Cognition and Ideology in Science 
Fiction and SF Criticism" 
Humanism, in its contemporary manifestation, is, in the last analysis, an 
ideological discourse the purpose of which is to reify petty-bourgeois values and 
attitudes in the guise of timeless truths. -Zavarzadeh and Morton, Theory, 
(Post)Modemity, Opposition 
Orson Scott Card's Ender trilogy, can serve as a "tutor text" for alien- 
encounter SF not only because all three novels have as their narrative 
dominant the alien encounter, but also because it tries both to theorize and 
to survey possible sets of relations between terran and alien actants. The 
theory takes the form of the Hierarchy of Foreignness articulated by Ender's 
sister Valentine, a conceptual framework based on distinctions found in the 
Nordic languages: 
The Nordic language recognizes four orders of foreignness. The first is the 
otherlander, or utldnning, the stranger that we recognize as being a human of our 
world, but of another city or country. The second is the... frtnling. This is the 
stranger that we recognize as human, but of another world. The third is the 
raman, the stranger that we recognize as human, but of another species. The 
fourth is the truly alien, the varelse, which includes all the animals, for with them 
no conversation is possible. (SD ?2:38) 
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In terms of alien-encounter SF, the two pertinent categories here are those 
of raman and varelse; aliens are either ramen or varelse, depending upon 
whether or not humans are able to communicate with them. With ramen, 
human beings can "work out differences and make decisions together." 
Varelse, on the other hand, are "'wise beasts,' clearly intelligent and yet 
completely unable to reach a common ground with humankind" (X ?9:151). 
Card's trilogy, then, proposes two kinds of alien Otherness, roughly equiv- 
alent to Benford's anthropocentric and unknowable aliens. 
The first novel in the trilogy examines the inevitable shape that the initial 
encounter with Otherness takes. Since such an encounter generally precludes 
the possibility of communication, the Other necessarily becomes varelse, 
with whom there is only one possible relation: "With ramen you can live and 
let live. But with varelse, there can be no dialogue. Only war" (X ?15:338). 
When the very first encounter with alien beings, the "buggers"-so named 
because of their insectlike appearance-results in the destruction of a human 
space ship and its crew, Earth decides that the buggers are mortal enemies, 
bent on extinction of the human race. Ender's commander justifies Earth's 
position in Darwinian terms: 
"If one of us has to be destroyed, let's make damn sure we're the ones alive at 
the end. Our genes won't let us decide any other way. Nature can't evolve a 
species that hasn't a will to survive. Individuals might be bred to sacrifice 
themselves, but a race as a whole can never decide to cease to exist. So if we can 
we'll kill every last one of the buggers, and if they can they'll kill eveiy last one 
of us." (EG ?13:278) 
In the first encounter between two species, evolutionary science takes 
precedence, and survival becomes the foremost consideration. Throughout 
the trilogy, the logic of evolution serves as the basic universal "law." In 
effect, through the operation of this law, sentient beings are all reduced to 
"wise beasts," animals who, having "passed through the crucible of natural 
selection," have been imprinted with an overriding directive-the will to 
survive (X ?11:206). In the intial encounter between such species, that 
directive inevitably results in war, and "when it comes to war, human is 
human and alien is alien. All that raman business goes up in smoke when 
we're talking about survival" (SD ?17:340). 
In prosecuting its war against the buggers, the government of Earth has 
established a program to single out gifted children at a very early age. These 
children are subjected to a rigorous military training program intended to 
produce the kind of military genius necessary to destroy the buggers. In 
order to foster this genius, the Battle School creates and accentuates the 
circumstances in which a skewered Darwinian model of relations predomi- 
nates-the war of all against all, where struggle is the modus vivendi and 
survival is the sole objective. Ender is thrown into a "military paradigm 
which assumes that humans are malleable, controllable objects" (Blackmore 
125), and fashioned into what the people of the Battle School need, a "tool," 
something they can use to serve their own ends. Graff, Ender's mentor, 
believes that "individual human beings are all tools, that the others use to 
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help us all survive" (EG 37). After his tra Ender has become the per- 
fect fighig machine, able to see the Other in only one of two ways, either 
as another tool to be used or as an enemy to be destroyed. In either case 
the Other is dehumanized, treated as varelse or reduced to the status of 
object, object-ified. 
Ender leaves the Battle School convinced that it is him against the world, 
locked into a two-value logic that sees the Other as a tool to be manipulated 
or something to be eliminated. Indeed, this logic dictates relations between 
sentient beings throughout much of the trilogy. InXenocide we discover that 
the "'godspoken" of the planet Path have been altered genetically by Star- 
ways Congess to become highly intelligent "slaves" (X ?11:193). And the 
pequininos of Lusitania are the products of the descolada virus, introduced 
there by "a coldhearted monster of efficiency" (X ?15:334) to reform the 
entire planet by "ungluing" species. Trying to explain the descolada, a 
xenologer on Lusitania speculates as follows: "What if there's a species 
somewhere that decided that in order to develop planets suitable for coloni- 
zation, they should send out the descolada virus in advance-thousands of 
years in advance, maybe-to intelligently transform planets into exactly the 
conditions they need?" (X ?14:271). A similar logic, it should be noted, 
drives the behaviors of all species that are locked into the view of the Other 
as varelse. For such species a planet is an object that needs to be "terra- 
formed." 
In Ender's Game, Ender himself is transformed into a kind of descolada 
virus, thereby living up to the pun in his name. He graduates from Battle 
School by taking a particularly grueling "final exam" culminating in a 
kamikaze assault upon the buggers' home planet and their Hive Queen. 
Ender learns afterwards that the games were not simulations at all but real 
battles, that he has wiped out a sentient species, that he is responsible for 
the death of ten billion buggers. Unknowingly, Ender has served as the 
ultimate tool, a doomsday weapon. Such subterfuge was absolutely necessary, 
Graff tells him: 
"It had to be a trick or you couldn't have done it. It's the bind we were in. We 
had to have a commander with so much empathy that he would think like the 
buggers, understand them and anticipate them. So much compassion that he 
could win the love of his underlings and work with them like a perfect machine, 
as perfect as the buggers. But somebody with that much compassion could never 
be the killer we needed. Could never go into battle willing to win at all costs. If 
you knew, you couldn't do it." (EG ?14:328) 
At the age of eleven, then, Ender has been "retooled" as the "perfect 
machine" needed to eliminate the Other. 
But he is not a mindless fighting machine, since the strategy of the Battle 
School calls on one of Ender's real strengths, his imagination. In order to 
defeat the Other, Ender must be able to put himself in the Other's place. In 
the process, however, Ender inevitably reconceives the Other as a Self, 
converting it from varelse to raman. Tapping into the "hive mind" of the 
Hive Queen, Ender sees the initial encounters between the species from her 
perspective. For the buggers, only the hive mind, centered in the queen, is 
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important; since eliminating the lives of workers does not affect the hive 
mind, it is not really murder; only queen-killing is real murder (EG ?14:297). 
From this perspective, Ender realizes, the death of a few human beings is 
equally trivial. When the hive mind comes to understand that by destroying 
human beings it had committed murder, it experiences such a powerful grief 
that Ender, sharing it empathetically, is reduced to tears. The last Hive 
Queen begs Ender for a second chance, telling him "we are like you....We 
did not mean to murder, and when we understood, we never came again" 
(EG ?15:353). Once Ender realizes that the war against the buggers 
represents unprovoked species genocide on the part of the humans ("we 
never came again"), once he has reconceived the Other as a Self ("we are 
like you"), he takes responsibility for his actions, despite the fact that he was 
being used by others. 
It should be clear that the real reason behind the human-bugger wars 
was the inability of the two species to communicate: "If the other fellow 
can't tell you his story," Graff notes, "you can never be sure he isn't trying 
to kill you" (EG ?13:278). Communication between species suspends the 
"law" of Darwinian struggle; it allows the humanization of the other, the 
conversion from varelse to raman. Speakerfor the Dead follows this process 
of conversion in humanity's relation with a second sentient alien species, the 
"pequininos" on the planet Lusitania. If Ender's Game foregrounds the 
treatment of Other-as-Enemy, then Speakerfor the Dead focuses on the idea 
of Other-as-Self. 
Since humanity, prompted by Ender's telling of the Hive Queen's story, 
now feels guilty about its treatment of the buggers, the discovery of a second 
sentient life form is seen by most as a second chance, an opportunity for 
redemption for the sin of slaughtering the buggers. In order to avoid another 
such debacle, Starways Congress quarantines Lusitania, establishing there a 
small scientific outpost under rigd guidelines and one basic stricture: the 
pequilinos are not to be disturbed. By min mizing contact in this way, 
Starways Congress intends to eliminate cultural contamination, to avoid 
"terraforming" Lusitania in any way: "The idea is to have as little impact on 
this world as possible" (SD ?6:102). 
The policy is not, however, as benign as it seems. For one thing, the 
relation between Earth and Lusitania is one-sided; the terran xenologer is 
put in a position of non-reciprocation, of trying to extract information 
without giving anything in return. Such an unfair relationship is built into the 
student/object of study definition, where the object is seen as just that, a 
thing with a certain number of verifiable properties or characteristics. The 
entire system guarantees, Ender notes, that the colonists can imagine only 
one cognitive relation with the pequininnos, to learn "about them" not "from 
them" (SD ?14:248). When Ender first arrives on the planet and sees the 
fence separating the scientific colony from the natives, he likens the colony 
there to a zoo or even a prison. He is reminded that in this situation the 
question of incarceration is a matter of perspective: "It's the human side of 
the fence that's connected to the rest of the universe, and the piggy side 
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that's trapped on its home world" (SD ?6:107). Indeed, the natives are very 
much confined in a zoo, reduced to the status of animals to be studied by 
their human masters, a point brought home by the name the humans use to 
describe them, "piggies." They are varelse, animals with whom no conversa- 
tion is possible. Indeed, the whole idea of seeing the pequiininos as the 
agents of human redemption reduces them to their usefulness to human 
beings, in effect denying them their status as "true ramen" (SD ?2:38). 
Inherent in the policy of minimal intervention is, of course, a covert 
political dimension; the supposedly neutral stance of the objective observer 
is itself politically "loaded," as feminist critics have made clear: "The 
observer's authority depends on his implicit or explicit superiority over the 
observed.... [His] effort to understand the object of his criticism and to 
articulate his understanding is, therefore, never quite clear of, never quite 
free from the issue of his power over the object" (Straub 856). Ender's other 
metaphor, the prison, suggests the real reason for the fence between the 
colonists and the natives and the true nature of their relationship: "Ender 
saw clearly that the rules govering human contact with the piggies did not 
really function to protect the pigges at all. They functioned to guarantee 
human superiority and power" (SD ?14:252-53). The claim that minimal 
intervention on Lusitania serves the interests of science while protecting an 
inferior culture is thus pure ideological obfuscation, meant to naturalize and 
rationalize a relationship of power. 
Humans thus control the pequininos by object-ifying them. Ender re- 
verses this process by insisting upon the humanity of the pequininos, by 
treating them as ramen. His particular genius is the ability to occupy the 
perspective of the Other, to see the Other as an other Self. He explains the 
pequilninos' view of the fence as follows: 
"You see, the piggies don't think of the fence the way we do. We see it as a way 
of protecting their culture from human influence and corruption. They see it as 
a way of keeping them from learning all the wonderful secrets that we know. 
They imagine our ships going from star to star, colonizing them, filling them up. 
And fi've or ten thousand years from now, when they finally learn all that we 
refuse to teach them, theyll emerge into space to fimd all the worlds filled up. 
No place for them at all. They think of our fence as a form of species murder. 
We will keep them on Lusitania like animals in a zoo, while we go out and take 
all the rest of the universe." (SD ?16:324) 
Ender comes to Lusitania to see if he can figure out why the pequininos 
cold-bloodedly eviscerated the first two xenologers sent to study them. 
Because the ritualistic murders seem to him to be purposeful, carefully 
executed acts, he assumes that they can be understood if they are recon- 
ceived from the pequininos' pespective. The very deliberateness of the 
murders suggests to Ender that these apparently senseless acts might have 
meaning if inserted into another frame of intelligibility. In order to discover 
that meaning, Ender must deal with the pequiniinos as ramen. Ramen, Ender 
knows, take responsibility for what they do. Not to hold the pequininos 
accountable is to treat them like varelse, something Ender refuses to do. 
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Accordingly, he asks them direct questions and accepts their answers at face 
value. In so doing, he learns that the pequininos did not mean to murder 
their victims at all, that the dismemberment of the xenologers was actually 
an attempt to honor the humans by "planting" them and giving them the 
third life that the pequininos enjoy. 
By assuming that the native Lusitanians are indeed ramen and that their 
actions are understandable, Ender is able in effect to discover their human- 
ity. The pequininos are revealed to be all too human. Embracing ideas of 
responsibility and experiencing guilt, they are horrified that they have 
unknowingly committed murder. They share with humans the traits of 
curiosity and an interest in narratives. They have very human ambitions-the 
desire to travel from star to star, the desire to make their tribe as great as 
possible. These, Ender notes, are the substance of the "dream of every living 
creature," the "desire for greatness" (SD ?17:364). Greatness here is defined 
in Darwinian terms, signifying primarily the proliferation and prosperity of 
the species. 
In Xenocide Card takes the idea of the alien as human and universalizes 
it, in effect anthropomorphizing the universe. The novel represents an 
ambitious attempt to come to terms with "the nature of life and reality" (X 
?15:299). Starting with the assumption that evolutionary science informs 
interspecies encounters, the novel explores whether or not xenocide is a fun- 
damental aw, built into the universe, examining in particular to what extent 
intelligent species are exempt from that law (X ?4:53). As in the other parts 
of the trilogy, interspecies war can only be avoided if interspecies communi- 
cation is possible, if competing species come together as ramen and not 
varelse. Varelse are "implacably hostile and dangerous," Ender insists, 
"aliens with whom we are naturally and permanently engaged in a war to 
the death, and at that time our only moral choice is to do all that's necessary 
to win" (X ?6:83). 
Ender, it should be noted, is guilty here of oversimplification, of assum- 
ing that the human species is necessarily and naturally raman (such a deter- 
mination is, after all, a matter of position and not essence), and that as 
ramen, humans can decide if the Other is raman or varelse. Such decisions 
may well be arbitrary; as one character observes, "Varelse is just the term 
[humans] invented to mean Intelligence-that-we've-decided-to-kill andraman 
means Intelligence-that-we-haven't-decided-to-kill-yet" (X ?15:304). This 
position is complicated even more by the recognition, elsewhere in the tril- 
ogy, that such determinations reveal more about the species that makes 
them than about the species being so classified: "The difference between 
raman and varelse is not in the creature judged, but in the creature judging. 
When we declare an alien species to be raman, it does not mean that they 
have passed a treshhold of moral maturity. It means that we have" (SD 
?1:1). 
In general, Xenocide glosses over this particular moral problematic, 
insisting that the keystone for interspecies encounters is the possibility of 
communication. But the idea of communication elaborated throughout he 
trilogy also rests on some questionable assumptions. In the first place, it is 
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very anthropomorphic, involving matters of enlightened self-interest, rational 
give-and-take, and inevitable compromise. It assumes basic human param- 
eters such as the idea of individual responsibility, a belief in equity, and the 
experience of guilt. Communication between species is thus logical in form 
and bourgeois in ideology, the pequininos may look like little pigs, but they 
talk like hard-headed midwesterners. Also, the idea of communication in the 
trilogy takes for granted a very unproblematic relation between signifier and 
signified and the ready translatability of one sign into another. 
That Card embraces an "essentialist" or logocentric position in regard 
to matters of language and selfliood is made clear in the way in which he 
"solves" the question of species difference, thereby resolving the multiple 
conflicts in Xenocide. He posits an irreducible basis to all existence, the 
"philote," the smallest conceivable physical particle, yet with no mass or 
inertia (X ?4:43). Philotes are "the things out of which all other things are 
made" (X ?15:313), but they are particularly instrumental to organic life: 
"Life is when a single philote has the strength of will to bind together the 
molecules of a single cell, to entwine their rays into one. A stronger philote can 
bind together many cells into a single organism. The strongest of all are the 
inteligent beings. We can bestow our philotic connections where we will. The 
philotic basis of intelligent life is even clearer in the other known sentient 
species. When a pequnino dies and passes into the third life, it's his strong-willed 
philote that preserves his identity and passes it from the mammaloid corpse to 
the living tree." (X ?4:43) 
"The philote at the center of our twining," Ender says, is the seat of "our 
individual identity" (X ?13:258) and the source of our individual wills. With 
philotes Card has effectively totalized life, supplied an essence, provided a 
repository or center which founds the Self. At the same time he has inevit- 
ably reduced all life to a monochromatic sameness. 
Before incarnation, philotes exist in another kind of space: "All in the 
same non-place. No place-ness in that place. No where-being." Their con- 
dition in that non-place is perpetual dissatisfaction, a "life-yeaning"; they 
are "all hungry for whereness. All thirsty for pattern. All lonely for selfness" 
(X ?15:313). Their name is perfectly appropriate because they are essentially 
love-bodies, servants of Desire-for presence, for being, for meaning, for 
plenitude. Their essential nature is ironically underscored by the role they 
play in the novel's resolution. In order to avoid a showdown between Star- 
ways Congress and the various sentient beings on Lusitania, Ender and his 
friends must discover faster-than-light travel. Philotic twining, it turns out, 
makes such travel possible, enabling a "strong" philote, one which com- 
mands its own pattern, to pop through to Outside non-space and back into 
Inside real-space. Time-travel works, in other words, because Lusitan 
physicists discover "the illuminating principle that wishing makes it so and 
all living creatures pop out of nowhere whenever they're needed" (X ?15: 
326). The same principle, of course, applies to philotes themselves, which 
may thus be seen as a function of Card's wish-fulness, the product of a 
reaction formation which converts the cold and hostile universe into a 
"loving" place where prayers just might be answered (cf. X ?15:347). 
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Like strong philotes, characters in novels somehow pop from the Outside 
into the Inside of the text. Card acknowledges the similarity quite overtly-, 
Ender brings back with him from his trip Outside all-too-human copies of 
his sister Valentine and his brother Peter, created ex nihilo by his powerful 
imagination. In this way the trilogy closes on a metafictional note, one 
sounded originally in Speaker for dte Dead. That volume recounts Ender's 
experiences as Speaker for the Dead, whose duty it is to tell "the story of 
the dead man as he saw himself, the life the dead woman meant to live, 
however badly it turned out" (SD ?9:146). Identifying with the dead, a 
Speaker can teD "true stories" (SD ?14:259), stories which reveal sympatheti- 
caDly but accurately the real experience of a single human individual. 
Speaking for the dead, it should be clear, is very much like being an author, 
a matter of telling true stories full of meaning and significance. In order to 
do it well, Card suggests, one must give one's Self over to the Other, must 
immerse one's identity in that of an Other. This, of course, is similar to what 
we do when we read a book; in effect, we listen to a speaking. To do it well, 
we too must give ourselves over to the Other, which is the speaking, which 
is the book. Every act of reading involves an encounter between Self and 
Other, an encounter fraught with immense potential. Such an encounter can 
make us into "someone else, someone less afraid, someone more compas- 
sionate" (SD ?13:231). 
The Ender trilogy thus surveys two possible treatments of alien alterity: 
the Other-as-Enemy and the Other-as-Self. The former treatment is shown 
to be predicated upon the belief that evolutionary law dictates the terms of 
all alien encounters, such law being that of "the jungle." This law justifies 
a strategy of systematic dehumanization of the Other, a perspective that 
ultimately infects both "friends" and "enemies," converting the Other into 
a tool to be used or an enemy to be destroyed. The trilogy unilaterally 
indicts those who so reduce the Other: "they would...have to be heartless, 
selfish, arrogant beings, to think that all life in the universe was theirs to 
manipulate as they saw fit" (X ?14:288). Loopholes in evolutionary law can 
be discovered or devised through interspecies communication. Such com- 
munication, Card insists, necessarily consists of the telling of stories, the 
story of the Self and the story of the Other. Sharing such stories, partaking 
of them, can convert the Other into a Self and make possible both en- 
lightenment and change: "I look through his eyes and see the world his new 
way and it changes everything" (X ?15:292). 
Occupying the position of the Other also serves to circumscribe the Self. 
When a pequinino named Human complains that humans are stupid because 
they refuse to believe what the pequininos tell them, Ender replies, "This is 
how humans are: We question all our beliefs, except the ones we really 
believe, and those we never think to question" (SD ?14:257). But from the 
perspective of the Other we can distance ourselves from those beliefs, the 
ones we really believe; from an estranged position we can subject them to 
interrogation. One of the xenologer's reports notes that the pequininos have 
adopted the Hierarchy of Foreignness, but that they refer to themselves as 
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"ramen." The report nearsightedly concludes that the pequin'inos misunder- 
stand the hierarchy or that they unconsciously view themselves from a terran 
perspective. But the pequlininos do consider themselves to be ramen-at once 
human and yet alien to themselves-in that their true being consists in the 
third life, after they have metamorphosed into tree form, when they "reach 
and drink from the sun, in the full light at last, never moving except in the 
wind" (SD ?17:369). This suggests, of course, that being merely human is a 
lower form of existence, lived out in the half-light of consciousness, full of 
haste and worry. Such a view emerges, however, only if one is able, at least 
momentarily, to adopt the perspective of the Other. 
But this treatment of the Other exacts its own cost. The Other, so 
conceived, may fmally be merely human. The trilogy suggests that the Other 
can almost always be "covered" by human paradigms (such as story-telling). 
There's never an excess, a surplus, of Other-ness. Accordingly, there's no 
need to transcend the human because the human is finally seen to be 
sufficient, adequate, neither too much nor too little. The last volume in the 
trilogy is, in this regard, aptly named; it effectively kills off the idea of 
strangeness. "Any animal is willing to kill the Other," says Ender, succinctly 
summarizing the Other-as-Enemy theme. "But the higher beings include 
more and more living things within their self-story, until at last there is no 
Other" (X ?11:205). Xenocide is one such self-story. 
3. Alien Aliens: The Other as Other 
Science fiction nowhere more firmly rejects-indeed, explodes-humanism than 
in treating the alien. -Gregory Benford, "Effmg the Ineffable" 
The alien is the creation of a need-man's need to designate something that is 
genuinely outside himself, something that is truly nonman, that has no initial 
relation to man except for the fact that it has no relation. -Slusser and Rabkin, 
"Introduction: The Anthropology of the Alien" 
"Biggest fact about aliens is, they're alien." -Gregory Benford, Big Sky River 
Gregory Benford notes in "Effing the Ineffable" that a friendly alien is an 
oxymoron, that "friendliness is a human category" (14); he thus indicates 
how easy and "natural" it is to see the alien in human terms and, corre- 
spondingly, how difficult it is to imagine the truly alien. How does one 
represent the unknowable, speak the unspeakable? In the same essay, 
Benford cites as an example the aliens in Terry Carr's "The Dance of the 
Changer and Three" who insist that "two and two are orange" (20). Such 
an overt violation of the dictates of mathematics and the frames of common 
sense does suggest an essential strangeness. While conceding that all 
renderings of the alien are relative, speculative SF attempts in various ways 
to suggest the possibility of, and even to approach the condition of, "real" 
ontological Otherness. 
An obvious way to suggest a "real" alien-encounter is by indirection, 
focusing not on the alien itself but on the human response to the alien. An 
author can, for example, render the human response in terms that draw on 
the reader's "sense of wonder," that "indefinable rush when beholding 
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something odd and new and perhaps awesome" (Benford, "Effing" 16). 
Arthur C. Clarke depicts the human encounter with the Overmind in 
Childhood's End as follows: 
"Now it looks like the curtains of the aurora, dancing and flickering across the 
stars. Why, that's what it really is, I'm sure-a great auroral storm. The whole 
landscape is lit up-it's brighter than day-reds and greens and golds are chasing 
each other across the sky-oh, it's beyond words, it doesn't seem fair that I'm the 
only one to see it-I never thought such colors...." (?24:215) 
Benford may be right that "'dat ole sensawonda' is the essential SF 
experience" and that "no alien should leave home without it" ("Effmg" 16), 
but Clarke's passage falls short of triggering it. The passage so emphasizes 
the human response (as opposed to the alien stimulus) that it risks devolving 
into exclamations and exclamation points. His approach confesses that the 
experience of Otherness is finally "beyond words." More important, it is also 
cognitively suspect; it makes no intellectual demands. It is like SF in general, 
according to a caustic Lem character, in that it supplies "the public with 
what it wants: truisms, cliches, stereotypes, all sufficiently costumed and 
made 'wonderful' so that the reader may sink into a safe state of surprise 
and at the same time not be jostled out of his philosophy of life" (His 
Master's Voice ?9:106-07). 
This is not to say that focusing on the human response necessarily means 
failure, nor that Clarke's novel fails as a whole. Indeed, Clarke's novel 
succeeds powerfully when it dwells on the Overmind's behaviors, on what it 
does to Earth and Earth's children. In order to render the human experience 
of speculative Otherness, the author must depict the "dissociation of 
sensibility" such an experience would entail. The author fractures language 
and syntax, trying to suggest "a sense of dislocation, of reality distortion, of 
fevered intermittent content" (Benford, "Effimg" 22). In his aptly named 
short story, "In Alien Flesh," Benford renders the climactic moment of 
contact as follows: 
-Bursting light that lanced through him, drummed a staccato rhythm of speckled 
green- 
-Twisting lines that meshed and wove into perspectives, triangles warped into 
strange saddle-pointed envelopes, coiling into new soundless shapes- 
-A latticework of shrill sound, ringing at edges of geometrical flatness- 
-Thick, rich foam that lapped against weathered stone towers, precisely turning 
under an ellipsoid orange sun- 
-Miniatured light that groaned and spun softly, curving into moisture that 
beaded on a coppery matrix of wire- 
-A webbing of sticky strands, lifting him- 
-A welling current- 
-Upward, toward the watery light- (19-20) 
Juxtaposing images, conflating the languages of science and nature, 
metamorphosing one sense into another-these literary devices can suggest 
the sensory experience of a genuinely different mode of perception. This 
technique has the advantage of allowing readers to share the experience 
themselves, to undergo alien-ation. The reader is not being "told" about the 
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experience, or even being "shown" it; he or she is given the opportunity to 
become the alien. 
Lem, in general, avoids rendering the alien in the ways elaborated above, 
in large part, I suspect, because he has reservations about their cognitive 
force, about their critical edge. He emphasizes another aspect of the human 
response to the alien-its limitations. In novels such as Solas, The Invin- 
cible, and His Master's Voice, he depicts speculative encounters in which the 
aliens truly live up to Benford's epithet; they are in some sense "unknow- 
able." Lem systematically interrogates the frames of intelligibility that human 
beings, scientists in particular, bring to the encounter; invanably he 
demonstrates how such frames are limited, or subjective, or emotionally 
colored, or simply inappropriate, hopelessly anthropomorphic. 
One of his favorite strategies for depicting the inadequacy of the human 
response, for representing the gap between Us and Them, is the telling 
metaphor. In His Master's Voice, for example, the efforts of the scientists to 
decode the "neutrino letter from the stars" (?3:43) are parodied by a series 
of belittling comparisons. The scientists are compared to ants feeding on the 
body of a dead philosopher, convinced that they are making good use of 
their find (?1:22). "Receiving the message from the stars," the scientist- 
narrator claims, "we did with it no more than a savage who, warming 
himself by a fire of burning books, the writings of the wisest men, believes 
that he has drawn tremendous benefit from his find!" (?1:27). Elsewhere he 
remarks that humans may have analyzed the "ink" with which the message 
has been "penned," but that discovery reveals absolutely nothing about "the 
intellectual attributes of the writer" (?8:104). These scientists are jamming 
a tape from a digital machine into a player piano and claiming to hear music 
(?13:145). These metaphors parody and ridicule the pretensions of the 
scientists while at the same time indicating the extent of their ignorance, the 
measure of their incomprehension. 
Lem's objective here and elsewhere is to indicate the limitations of 
humanity in its encounter with Otherness. He seems more concerned with 
the investigators than with the object of their investigations. He draws maps, 
very good maps, of human ignorance, of humanity's blind spots. In His 
Master's Voice, for example, he shows how the scientific view of the universe 
is totally unable to deal with the idea of intentionality: 
Because scientists learn to conduct so-called games with nature, with a nature 
that is not-from any permissible point of view-a personal antagonist, they are 
unable to countenance the possibility that behind the object of investigation there 
indeed stands a Someone, and that to become familiar with that object will be 
possible only insofar as one draws near, through reasoning, to its completely 
anonymous creator. Therefore, though they supposedly knew and freely admitted 
that the Sender was a reality, their whole life's training, the whole acquired 
expertise of their respective flelds, worked against that knowledge. (?2:33) 
Clearly, Lem's targets here include both scientists and science-fiction 
authors; both communities are locked into a limited set of conceptualiza- 
tions. Elsewhere Lem's narrator indicts humanity for its tendency to see the 
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Other either in terms of use-value (?4:61) or, through "paralysis of imagina- 
tion," as an enemy committed to the annihilation of Earth (?8:101), tenden- 
cies which, as we have seen, Card also deals with in the Ender trilogy. The 
interrogation of human epistemological assumptions, it should be noted, is 
not solely the province of the speculative alien-encounter SF. One of the 
classic stories of the "Golden Age," Zelazny's "A Rose for Ecclesiastes," 
features an encounter between terran poet and all-too-human Martian 
"houri" that subverts one of the most common human frames of intelligibil- 
ity-the idea of romantic love. 
Card, Zelazny, and Lem, then, use the alien-encounter to probe the 
limits of human knowledge and understanding. Unlike Card and Zelazny, 
however, Lem also takes on anthropomorphic notions of communication. 
Card's humans and aliens converse easily-, they swap stories and cut deals. 
Zelazny's poet translates Ecclesiastes into "high" Martian, in so doing saving 
the Martian race. Communication with Lem's alien aliens is much more 
problematic, conducted as it is through a "veil of incomprehensible signs" 
(His Master's Voice ?2:32). Lem's title itself refers to a kind of miscommu- 
nication between two different orders of being. Lem understands that the 
alien alien is necessarily characterized by an excess, a surplus of signification, 
an inadequation between signifier and signified. Such excess is, by defmition, 
"beyond words"; all attempts at description, at direct rendering, inevitably 
violate the alien's irreducible strangeness. Even to refer to the enigmatic 
sentient being in Lem's Solars as an "ocean" is to geomorphize it. Linguistic 
formulation, it seems, involves some sort of xenocide. 
The question remains: If one is committed to rendering an alien alien 
(and not merely the human response to such a being), how then does one 
go about it? The author must somehow encode an irreducible degree of 
mystery, something that radically defies comprehension or intelligibility. This 
is most effectively done through "alien effects"; the author focuses not on 
what the alien is but on what it does. The ocean being in Solaris fashions 
massive colloidal compositions that resist both description and explanation. 
The ocean's activities can be recuperated or naturalized, Lem shows, in very 
different, even contradictory, ways: a mimoid formation is thought to be a 
"stillbirth" by one observer, a "necrosis" by another (?8:122-23). Even more 
uncanny are acts that obviously reflect intentionality but deflect intelligibility. 
The ocean-being manufactures Phi-creatures that it "reads out" from the 
investigating humans' subconscious or unconscious minds; the appearance 
of these creatures seems to represent an attempt to make contact and an 
intentional act. But given the nature of the Phi-creatures, that intention 
remains entirely obscure, so much so as to problematize the idea of inten- 
tion itself-is the idea of intentionality simply a human construct, a function 
of human desire? 
In a similarly enigmatic way, the Overmind in Clarke's Childhood's End 
works a terrible metamorphosis upon the children of humanity, converting 
them into something extrahuman and incomprehensible, a strange transindi- 
vidual being that reshapes continents and makes rivers flow uphill. Clarke's 
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novel foregrounds an essential aspect of the encounter with speculative 
Otherness, the possibility of transcendence, of passing beyond the merely 
human. Benford and Gordon Eklund depict a series of such encounters in 
If the Stars Are Gods. Their protagonist, Bradley Reynolds, makes personal 
contact with a spectrum of aliens, including extraterrestrial giraffe-beings, 
the sphere "'whales" of Jupiter, the lattice creatures of Titan; all of his 
encounters are informed by a common concern-the need to discover some- 
thing beyond the Self. The giraffe-beings, who ironically assume the names 
Jonathon and Richard, have entered the solar system in order to converse 
with the sun. "We would like to visit and converse with your star," they 
matter-of-factly tell Reynolds, because it is both "powerful" and "benevo- 
lent" (?2:32). Over a period of time they teach Bradley how to speak to the 
Sun through song, and he undergoes a truly alien-encounter (?2:62-64), 
"experiencing something personal that no other man would ever know" (?2: 
66). This touchstone experience dictates Reynolds' subsequent career, driving 
him outward through the solar system in search of what the first encounter 
had given him, "the edge of true meaning" (?2:74). For him the alien- 
encounter entails the possibility of "revelations" (?5:192), a word that calls 
to mind Benford's remark that the most "unknowable" alien of all is, of 
course, God. 
Before leaving the solar system in search of other star-gods, Jonathon 
tells Reynolds that stars are indeed alive and that he should "think of them 
as doorways" through which humans are not ready to pass (?2:76). The 
metaphor here figures the alien encounter as a rite of passage from one 
universe to another, from one reality to another. This is perhaps the most 
troubling and wonderful aspect of such an encounter; "the truly alien doesn't 
just disturb and educate," Benford notes, "it breaks down reality, often 
fatally, for us" ("Effing" 23). Bradley Reynolds's encounter with the lattice 
creatures on Titan culminates in a fmal estrangement involving both reve- 
lation and death: "The sky shattered. Something broke inside him" (?5:210). 
The reaction to the alien can be so violent as to cause the human actant 
to become alien to himself, to experience a real alien-ation (Slusser and 
Rabkin xii). Wesson, the protagonist in Damon Knight's "Stranger Station," 
after four months exposure to a crab-like alien creature, finds his perceptual 
field altered or contaminated: 
He held the back of one hand close to his eyes. He saw the dozens of tiny 
cuneiform wrinkles stamped into the skin over the knuckles, the pale hairs 
sprouting, the pink shiny flesh of recent scars. I'm human, he thought. But when 
he let his hand fall on the console, the bony fmgers seemed to crouch like 
crustaceans' legs, ready to scuttle. (131) 
When he thinks he has figured out the alien's intentions, Wesson tries to 
communicate them to the shipboard computer only to find out that he can 
no longer understand English, can no longer read or write: "The black 
letters were alien squiggles on the page, little humped shapes, without 
meaning" (132). Learning to converse with the alien has rendered him 
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unable to converse with his fellow human beings. In one stroke Knight 
sabotages Card's distinction between raman and varelse. The story ends in 
chaos and ambiguity as Wesson's hold on reality dissolves. The encounter 
with speculative Otherness entails the possibility of "falling through" from 
one reality to another, of really radical change, of a fate that itself is 
ineffable. The human race in Childhood's End comes to "an end that no 
prophet had ever foreseen-an end that repudiated optimism and pessimism 
alike" (?23:205), a fate which obviates human categories of hope and fear. 
In general, then, we can contrast extrapolative and speculative ncounters 
in terms of how we recuperate or naturalize them. Extrapolative ncounters 
can be recuperated within existing human or scientific paradigms. The 
anthropocentric alien may be more or less than human, but it is human 
nonetheless, and its humanity reflects back upon our own. In the extrapola- 
tive encounter we appropriate the alien, turning it into our property by 
giving it our properties. The speculative encounter finally resists appropria- 
tion, refuses to be "named." Insisting upon the possibility of something 
extrahuman, nonhuman, or metahuman, this encounter necessarily plays 
upon and with religious ideas of faith, transcendence, and apotheosis. The 
alien alien is meant to be "ingested" (Benford, "Aliens and Knowabiity" 
63); in the ideal case, the reader experiences a transfiguration that inter- 
rogates and problematizes all human assumptions and beliefs. 
In its most extreme form, the speculative encounter suggests in fact that 
"the universe may be unknowable, and its 'moral' structure might forever lie 
beyond humanity's ken" (Benford, "Effing" 23). And yet even while it calls 
in question "cognitive universality" (Lem, His Master's Voice ?1:26-27), 
speculative SF does not completely endorse cognitive pessimism. As Benford 
notes, the "science" in SF "represents knowledge" ("Effing" 13), the 
possibility of gaining some kind of purchase, however tenuous, upon the 
unknown. The scientists in His Master's Voice may finally fail to translate the 
"letter from the stars," but Hogarth the scientist-narrator insists that it is 
indeed a letter, only one so cleverly crafted that it prohibits misreading and 
misuse (?2:192-94). Elsewhere he speaks of the "march" of science/knowl- 
edge: 
Science meanwhile advances at its gradual pace, often slowing to a crawl, and for 
periods it even walks in place, but eventually it reaches the various ultimate 
trenches dug by philosophical thought, and, quite heedless of the fact that it is 
not supposed to be able to cross those final barriers to the intellect, goes right 
on. (?2:29) 
The speculative alien encounter represents one such barrier. 
NOTES 
1. For an elaboration of this distinction, see Malmgren, Wodds Apart, pp. 11-15. 
2. The trilogy consists of Ender's Game (1985), Speaker for the Dead (1986), and 
Xenocide (1991). I will use the abbreviations EG, SD, and X in the discussion that 
follows. 
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Abstract.-Alien-encounterSFinvolves the introduction of sentient alien beings 
into the actantial system of the fictional universe; one or more of the actants 
are nonhuman or superhuman or subhuman. By staging a confrontation 
between an alien actant and a terran representative, alien-encounter SF 
broaches the question of Self and the Other. The reader ecuperates thisfiction 
by comparing human and alien entities, measuring the Self by examining the 
Other. 
Alien encounters can be discriminated according to the extent o which the 
alien actant adheres to or departs from anthropocentnic norms; in simple tenns, 
we can distinguish between "human aliens" and "alien aliens." This artick 
eramines the nature of human aliens by anal&ng Orson Scott Card's Ender 
trilogy, a work which theorizes and surveys possible sets of relations between 
terran and alien actants. It explores the problematics of alien aliens by looking 
at appropriate texts by Lem, Benfor4 and Clarke. (CDM) 
